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Abstract
Inspired by successful biological collective decision mechanisms such as honey bees searching for
a new colony or the collective navigation of fish schools, we consider a mean field games (MFG)-like
scenario where a large number of agents have to make a choice among a set of different potential target
destinations. Each individual both influences and is influenced by the group’s decision, as represented
by the mean trajectory of all agents. The model can be interpreted as a stylized version of opinion
crystallization in an election for example. The agents’ biases are dictated first by their initial spatial
position and, in a subsequent generalization of the model, by a combination of initial position and a priori
individual preference. The agents have linear dynamics and are coupled through a modified form of
quadratic cost. Fixed point based finite population equilibrium conditions are identified and associated
existence conditions are established. In general multiple equilibria may exist and the agents need to
know all initial conditions to compute them precisely. However, as the number of agents increases
sufficiently, we show that (i) the computed fixed point equilibria qualify as epsilon Nash equilibria, (ii)
agents no longer require all initial conditions to compute the equilibria but rather can do so based on a
representative probability distribution of these conditions now viewed as random variables. Numerical
results are reported.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Collective decision making is a common phenomenon in social structures ranging from animal
populations [3], [4] to human societies [5]. Examples include honey bees searching for a new
colony [6], [7], the navigation of fish schools [8], [9], or quorum sensing [10]. Collective
decisions involve dynamic “microscopic-macroscopic” or “individual-social” interactions. On
the one hand, individual choices are socially influenced, that is influenced by the behavior of
the group. On the other hand, the collective behavior itself results from aggregating individual
choices. In elections for example, an interplay between individual interests and collective opinion
swings leads to the crystallization of final decisions [5], [11], [12].
“Homing” optimal control problems, first introduced by Whittle and Gait in [13] and studied
later in [14]–[17] for example, are concerned with a single agent trying to reach one of multiple
predefined final states. Here we consider a similar fundamental issue but in a multi-agent setting.
A large number of agents initially spread out in Rn need to move within a finite time horizon
to one of multiple possible home or target destinations. They must do so while trying to remain
tightly grouped and expending as little control effort as possible. Our goal is to model situations
in which the choice made by each agent regarding which destination to reach both influences
and depends on the behavior of the population. For example, when honey bees determine their
next site to establish a colony, they must make a choice between different alternatives based
on the information provided by scouts, who are themselves part of the group. Even though
certain colonies can be easier to reach and are more attractive for some bees, following the
majority is still a priority to enhance the foraging ability. Similarly, in a navigation situation for
a collection of micro robots exploring an unknown terrain, remaining grouped may be necessary
for achieving coordinated collective tasks [18]–[21]. In animal collective navigation, discrete
choices must be made regarding the route to take, but at the same time staying with the group
offers better protection against predators. Finally, our model may be an abstract representation
of opinion crystallization in an election where (i) relative distances measure current differences
of opinions, (ii) individuals are sensitive to collective opinion swings, and (iii) a choice must be
made before a finite deadline [5], [11], [12].
A related topic in economics is discrete choice models where an agent makes a choice between
multiple alternatives such as mode of transportation [22], entry and withdrawal from the labor
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3market, residential location [23], or a physician [24]. In many circumstances, these individual
choices are influenced by the so called “Peer Effect”, “Neighborhood Effect” or “Social Effect”.
In particular, Brock and Durlauf [25] use an approach similar to Mean Fied Games (MFG) [26],
[27] and inspired by statistical mechanics to study a static binary discrete choice model with a
large number of agents which takes into account the effect of the agents’ interdependence on the
individual choices. In their model, the individual choices are influenced by the mean of the other
agents’ choices, while for an infinite size population, the impact of an isolated individual choice
on this mean is negligible. The authors show that in an infinite size rational population, each
agent can predict this mean as the result of a fixed point calculation, and makes a decentralized
choice based upon its prediction. Moreover, multiple anticipated means may exist. Our analysis
leads to similar insights for a dynamic non-cooperative multiple choice game including situations
where the agents have limited information about the dynamics of other agents.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we formulate our problem, state our main contributions and provide an outline
for the rest of the paper.
A. Deterministic Case
We consider a dynamic non-cooperative game involving N players with identical linear
dynamics
x˙i = Axi +Bui ∀i ∈ {1 . . . , N}, (1)
where xi ∈ Rn is the state of agent i and ui ∈ Rm its control input. Player i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is
associated with an individual cost functional
Ji(ui, x¯, x
0
i ) =
∫ T
0
{q
2
‖xi − x¯‖2 + r
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt+
M
2
min
j=1,...,l
(
‖xi(T )− pj‖2
)
, (2)
where x¯(t) , 1/N
∑N
i=1 xi(t), pj ∈ Rn (for j = 1, . . . , l), q, r are positive constants and M
is a large positive number. The running cost requires the agents to develop as little effort as
possible while moving and to stay grouped around the mean of the population. Moreover, each
agent should reach before the final time T one of the destinations pj, j = 1, . . . , l. Otherwise,
it is strongly penalized by the terminal cost. Hence, the overall individual cost captures the
problem faced by each agent of deciding between a finite set of alternatives, while trying to
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4remain close to the mean population trajectory. It is sometimes convenient to write the costs in a
game theoretic form, i.e. Ji(ui, u−i), where u−i = (u1, . . . , ui−1, ui+1, . . . , uN). We seek -Nash
strategies, i.e. such that an agent can benefit at most  through unilateral deviant behavior, with
 going to zero as N goes to infinity [28]. We assume that each agent can observe only its own
state and the initial states of the other agents.
Definition 1: Consider N players, a set of strategy profiles S = S1×· · ·×SN and for each player
k, a payoff function Jk(u1, . . . , uN), ∀(u1, . . . , uN) ∈ S. A strategy profile (u∗1, . . . , u∗N) ∈ S is
called an −Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs Jk if there exists an  > 0 such that for
any fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ N and for all ui ∈ Si, we have
Ji(ui, u
∗
−i) ≥ Ji(u∗i , u∗−i)− .
Inspired by the framework of MFG theory [18], [26]–[30] discussed in Section II-C below,
we develop a class of decentralized strategies based on a fixed point requirement. Identification
of the strategies requires only that an agent knows its own state and the initial states of the other
agents. As we later show in the paper, when the number of agents N increases without bound,
these fixed point based strategies achieve their meaning as −Nash equilibria.
B. Stochastic Case
As N goes to infinity, it is also convenient to think of the initial states as realizations of random
variables resulting from a common probability distribution function in a collection of independent
experiments. Agent i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , is then associated with the following adequately modified
cost:
Ji(ui, x¯, x
0
i ) = E
(∫ T
0
{q
2
‖xi − x¯‖2 + r
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt+
M
2
min
j=1,...,l
(
‖xi(T )− pj‖2
)∣∣∣x0i). (3)
In this case, we establish that an agent only needs to know its own state and the common initial
states probability distribution to construct one of the decentralized fixed point based strategies
alluded to earlier.
C. The MFG Approach and our Contributions
The MFG approach is concerned with a class of dynamic non-cooperative games involving a
large number of players where the individual strategies are considerably affected by the mass
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5behavior, while the influence of an isolated individual strategy on the group is negligible. Linear
Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) MFG problems were developed in [26], [28], [29], while the general
nonlinear stochastic framework was considered in [27], [31]–[33]. The MFG approach posits
at the outset an infinite population to which one can ascribe a deterministic although initially
unknown macroscopic behavior. Hence, one starts by assuming that the mean field contributed
term x¯ in the cost is given and equal to some xˆ. The cost functions being now decoupled,
each agent optimally tracks xˆ. The resulting control laws are decentralized. This analysis of
the tracking problem is presented in Section III. By implementing the resulting decentralized
strategies in the dynamics of the agents, a new candidate tracking path is obtained by computing
the corresponding mean population trajectory. Indeed, and it is a fundamental argument in
MFG analysis, asymptotically as the population grows, the posited tracked path is an acceptable
candidate only if it is reproduced as the mean of the agents when they optimally respond to it.
Thus, we look for candidate trajectories which are fixed points of the tracking path to tracking
path map defined above. In Section IV, these fixed points are studied for the deterministic case
with a finite population, and an explicit expression is obtained by assuming that each agent
knows the exact initial states of all other agents. The alternative probabilistic description of the
agents’ initial states is explored in Section V. In Section VI, we further generalize the problem
formulation to include initial preferences towards the target destinations. Moreover, we consider
that the agents have nonuniform dynamics and that each agent has limited information about
the other agents dynamic parameters in the form of a statistical distribution over the matrices
A and B. Section VII shows that the decentralized strategies developed when tracking the fixed
point trajectories constitute −Nash equilibria in all the cases considered above, with  going to
zero as N goes to infinity. In Section VIII, we provide some numerical simulation results, while
Section IX presents our conclusions.
Although we rely on the MFG methodology in order to analyze the behavior of many agents
choosing one of the available destinations, our model is not standard with respect to the LQG
MFG literature. Specifically, our cost is non-convex and non-smooth in order to capture the
combinatorial aspect of the discrete-decision making problem. Hence, the existence proofs for
a fixed point rely here on topological fixed point theorems rather than a contraction argument
as in [26]. One of the main contributions of this paper is also to show that in the case of a
uniform population, the infinite dimensional MFG fixed point problem [27], [31] has a finite
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6dimensional version that can be solved via Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [34]. For a nonuniform
population, the existence of a fixed point path relies on an abstract fixed point theorem, namely
Schauder’s fixed point theorem [34]. In both cases, to solve the MFG equation system, one
needs to know the initial probability distribution of the players, whereas in the standard LQG
MFG problems, it is sufficient to know the initial mean to anticipate the macroscopic behavior.
Thus, in a nutshell, the theoretical tools needed to address this new formulation are thoroughly
different. Further highlighting the differences between the two problems, the standard LQ MFG
problem with stochastic dynamics is entirely tractable, whereas solving an extension to the
current formulation with stochastic dynamics remains thus far beyond reach.
Preliminary versions of our results appeared in the conference papers [1], [2]. Here we provide
a unified discussion of our collective choice model for the deterministic and stochastic scenarios,
as well as more extensive results. Many of the proofs were omitted from the conference papers
due to space limitations and can be found here. The simulation section is also expanded with
respect to [1], [2] and provides additional insight on the role of the different parameters in the
model.
D. Notation
The following notation is used throughout the paper. We denote by C(X, Y ) the set of
continuous functions from a normed vector space X to Y ⊂ Rk with the standard supremum
norm ‖.‖∞. We fix a generic probability space (Ω,F ,P) and denote by P(A) the probability
of an event A, and by E(X) the expectation of a random variable X . The indicator function of
a subset X is denoted by 1X and its interior by
◦
X . We denote by |X| the size of a finite set
X . The transpose of a matrix M is denoted by MT . We denote by Ik the identity k× k matrix.
The subscript i is used to index entities related to the agents, while the subscripts j and k are
used to index entities related to the home destinations. We denote by [x]k the k-th component
of a vector x.
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7III. TRACKING PROBLEM AND BASINS OF ATTRACTION
A. Tracking Problem
Following the MFG approach, we assume the trajectory x¯(t) in (2) and (3) to be arbitrary for
now and equal to xˆ(t). The cost functions (2) and (3) can be written
Ji(ui, xˆ, x
0
i ) = min
j=1,...,l
Jij(ui, xˆ, x
0
i ), (4)
where
Jij(ui, xˆ, x
0
i ) =
∫ T
0
{q
2
‖xi − xˆ‖2 + r
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt+
M
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2. (5)
Moreover, we have
inf
ui(.)
Ji(ui, xˆ, x
0
i ) = min
j=1,...,l
(
inf
ui(.)
Jij(ui, xˆ, x
0
i )
)
.
Assuming a full (local) state feedback, the optimal control for (4) is
u∗i = u
∗
ij if Jij(u
∗
ij, xˆ, x
0
i ) = min
k=1,...,l
Jik(u
∗
ik, xˆ, x
0
i ),
where u∗ik is the optimal solution of the simple linear quadratic tracking problem with cost
function Jik. We recall the optimal control laws [35]
u∗ik(t) = −
1
r
BT
(
Γ(t)xi + βk(t)
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , l},
with the corresponding optimal (simple) costs
J∗ik(xˆ, x
0
i ) =
1
2
(x0i )
TΓ(0)x0i + βk(0)
Tx0i + δk(0),
where Γ, βk and δk are respectively matrix-, vector-, and real-valued functions satisfying the
following backward propagating differential equations:
Γ˙− 1
r
ΓBBTΓ + ΓA+ ATΓ + qIn = 0 (6a)
β˙k =
(
1
r
ΓBBT − AT
)
βk + qxˆ (6b)
δ˙k =
1
2r
(βk)
TBBTβk − 1
2
qxˆT xˆ, (6c)
with the final conditions
Γ(T ) = MIn, βk(T ) = −Mpk, δk(T ) = 1
2
MpTk pk.
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8We define the basins of attraction
Dj(xˆ) =
{
x ∈ Rn such that (βj(0)− βk(0))Tx ≤ δk(0)− δj(0), ∀k = 1, . . . , l}, (7)
for j = 1, . . . , l. If an agent i is initially in Dj(xˆ), then the smallest optimal (simple) cost is J∗ij ,
and player i goes towards the corresponding destination point pj .
Assumption 1: Conventionally, we assume that if x0i ∈ ∩km=1Djm(xˆ), for some j1 < · · · < jk,
then the player i goes towards pj1 . Under Assumptions 2 and 5, this convention does not affect
the analysis in case of random initial conditions.
We summarize the above analysis in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, the tracking problem (4) has a unique optimal control law
u∗i (t) = −
1
r
BT
(
Γ(t)xi + βj(t)
)
if x0i ∈ Dj(xˆ), (8)
where Γ, βj , δj are the unique solutions of (6a)-(6c).
The optimal control laws (8) depend on the tracked path xˆ(t) and the local state xi. As
mentioned above, each agent should reach one of the predefined destinations. We show in the
next lemma that for any horizon length T, M can be made large enough that each agent reaches
an arbitrarily small neighborhood of some destination point by applying the control law (8). The
result is proved for tracked paths xˆ(t) that are uniformly bounded with respect to M , a property
that is shown to hold later in Lemma 3 for the desired tracked paths (fixed point tracked paths).
Lemma 2: Suppose that the pair (A,B) is controllable and for each M > 0, the agents are
optimally tracking a path xˆM(t). We suppose that the family xˆM(t) is uniformly bounded with
respect to M for the norm
( ∫ T
0
‖.‖2dt
) 1
2
. Then, for any  > 0, there exists M0 > 0 such that
for all M > M0, each agent is at time T in a ball of radius  and centered at one of the pj’s,
for j = 1, . . . , l.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Given any continuous path xˆ(t), there exist l basins of attraction where all the agents initially
in Dj(xˆ) prefer going towards pj , j = 1, . . . , l. Therefore, the mean of the population is highly
dependent on the structure of Dj(xˆ), j = 1 . . . , l. In the next paragraph, we study the properties
of these basins in more detail.
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9B. Basins of Attraction
We start by giving an explicit solution of (6b) and (6c). Let Π(t) = 1
r
Γ(t)BBT − AT and
Φ(., η), for η ∈ R, be the unique solution of
dΦ(t, η)
dt
= Π(t)Φ(t, η) Φ(η, η) = In, (9)
and
Ψ(η1, η2, η3, η4) = Φ(η1, η2)
TBBTΦ(η3, η4). (10)
Two main properties of the state transition matrix Φ are used in this paper, namely the matrix
Φ(η1, η2) has an inverse Φ(η2, η1) and the state transition matrix Φ˜(η1, η2) of −ΠT is equal to
Φ(η2, η1)
T . For more details about the properties of the state transition matrix, one can refer to
[36]. We have
βk(t) = −MΦ(t, T )pk + q
∫ t
T
Φ(t, σ)xˆ(σ) dσ
δk(t) =
1
2
MpTk pk −
q
2
∫ t
T
xˆ(σ)T xˆ(σ) dσ
+
M2
2r
pTk
∫ t
T
Ψ(η, T, η, T ) dη pk − Mq
r
pTk
∫ t
T
∫ η
T
Ψ(η, T, η, σ)xˆ(σ) dσdη
+
q2
2r
∫ t
T
∫ η
T
∫ η
T
xˆ(σ)TΨ(η, σ, η, τ)xˆ(τ) dτdσdη.
(11)
By replacing (11) in the expression of Dj(xˆ), (7) can be written
Dj(xˆ) =
{
x ∈ Rn such that βTjkx ≤ δjk + αjk(xˆ), ∀k = 1, . . . , l
}
, (12)
where
βjk = MΦ(0, T )(pk − pj)
δjk =
1
2
MpTk pk −
1
2
MpTj pj
+
M2
2r
pTk
∫ 0
T
Ψ(η, T, η, T ) dη pk − M
2
2r
pTj
∫ 0
T
Ψ(η, T, η, T ) dη pj
αjk(xˆ) =
Mq
r
(pj − pk)T
∫ 0
T
∫ η
T
Ψ(η, T, η, σ)xˆ(σ) dσdη.
(13)
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IV. FIXED POINT - DETERMINISTIC CASE
Having presented the solution of the general tracking problem, we now seek a continuous
path xˆ(t) that is sustainable, in the sense that it can be replicated by the mean of the agents
under their optimal tracking control laws. We start by analyzing the finite size population where
the initial state of each agent is known to all the agents. We start our search for the desired path
xˆ(t) by computing the mean x¯(t) when tracking any continuous path xˆ(t). The dynamics of the
mean when tracking xˆ ∈ C([0, T ],Rn) satisfies
˙¯x = −ΠT x¯− q
r
BBT
∫ t
T
Φ(t, σ)xˆ(σ) dσ +
M
r
BBTΦ(t, T )pλ(xˆ), (14)
where x¯(0) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
0
i , x¯0, pλ(xˆ) =
∑l
j=1
λj(xˆ)
N
pj and λj(xˆ) is the number of agents initially
in Dj(xˆ), which therefore pick pj as a destination. We obtain (14) by substituting (11) in (8) and
the resulting control law in (1) to subsequently compute x¯ = 1/N
∑N
i=1 xi and its derivative.
Thus, the mean of the population x¯ when tracking any continuous path xˆ is the image of xˆ by
a composite map G = G2 ◦G1, where
G1 : C([0, T ],Rn) 7→ C([0, T ],Rn)× Nl
xˆ 7→
(
xˆ,
(
λ1(xˆ), . . . , λl(xˆ)
))
G2 : C([0, T ],Rn)× Nl 7→ C([0, T ],Rn)(
xˆ,
(
λ1, . . . , λl
)) 7→ x¯
and x¯ = G2
((
xˆ,
(
λ1, . . . , λl
)))
is the unique solution of (14) in which λj(xˆ) is equal to an
arbitrary λj , j = 1, . . . , l.
The desired path describing the mean trajectory is a fixed point of G. In the following, we con-
struct a one to one map between the fixed points of G and the fixed points of a finite dimensional
operator F describing the way the population splits between the destination points. We start by
showing that the fixed points of G have a special form. For any λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) ∈ {0, ..., N}l,
we define a new map Tλ from C([0, T ],Rn) to C([0, T ],Rn), where Tλ(xˆ) = G2(xˆ, λ). If xˆ is
a fixed point of G and λ0 = λ(xˆ), then xˆ is a fixed point of Tλ0 . In the following lemma, we
show that for any λ, Tλ has a unique fixed point yλ, and we give an explicit form for yλ.
Lemma 3: For all λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) ∈ {0, ..., N}l, Tλ has a unique fixed point equal to
yλ = R1(t)x¯0 +R2(t)pλ, (15)
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where
R1(t) = ΦP (t, 0)
R2(t) =
M
r
∫ t
0
ΦP (t, σ)BB
TΦP (T, σ)
Tdσ,
(16)
and P and ΦP (t, η) are the unique solutions of
P˙ = −PA− ATP + 1
r
PBBTP, P (T ) = MIn
Φ˙P (t, η) = −(A− 1
r
BBTP )TΦP (t, η), ΦP (η, η) = In.
(17)
Moreover, if (A,B) is controllable, then the paths yλ are uniformly bounded with respect to M
for the norm
( ∫ T
0
‖.‖2dt
) 1
2
.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The fixed point path (15) is the optimal state of the LQR problem (5), where q = 0 and the
final destination point is pλ.
Hitherto, we know that the fixed points of G are of the form (15). To narrow the search
further, we derive a necessary condition on the vector λ so that the corresponding yλ is a fixed
point of G. We start by replacing the new expression of the fixed points (15) in the expressions
of the basins of attraction, which then have the following form:
Hλj = Dj(R1(t)x¯0 +R2(t)pλ) = {x ∈ Rn|βTjkx ≤ δjk + θjkx¯0 + ξjkpλ ∀k = 1, . . . , l
}
,
where
θjk =
Mq
r
(pTj − pTk )
∫ 0
T
∫ η
T
Ψ(η, T, η, σ)R1(σ) dσdη (18)
ξjk =
Mq
r
(pTj − pTk )
∫ 0
T
∫ η
T
Ψ(η, T, η, σ)R2(σ) dσdη. (19)
Following the discussion above and Lemma 3, we can claim that if xˆ is a fixed point of G, then
xˆ is of the form (15), where
λ = λ(xˆ) = (
∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ D1(xˆ)}∣∣, . . . , ∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ Dl(xˆ)}∣∣)
= (
∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ Hλ1 }∣∣, . . . , ∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ Hλl }∣∣) , F (λ). (20)
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Thus, we proved that if xˆ is a fixed point of G, then xˆ is of the form (15), where λ is a fixed
point of the finite dimensional operator F defined in (20). To prove the converse, we consider
a fixed point λ of F and the path xˆ = R1(t)x¯0 +R2(t)pλ. We have
λ = F (λ) = (
∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ Hλ1 }∣∣, . . . , ∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ Hλl }∣∣)
= (
∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ D1(xˆ)}∣∣, . . . , ∣∣{x0i |x0i ∈ Dl(xˆ)}∣∣) = λ(xˆ),
where the third equality is a consequence of the form of xˆ. The path xˆ is the unique fixed point
of Tλ. But xˆ = Tλ(xˆ) = Tλ(xˆ)(xˆ) = G(xˆ). Therefore, xˆ is a fixed point of G. We summarize the
above discussion in the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The path xˆ is a fixed point of G if and only if it has the form (15), where λ is a
fixed point of F .
Without loss of generality, we can index in the binary choice case (l = 2) the agents going
towards p1 by numbers lower than those given to the agents going towards p2 as follows:
βT12x
0
1 ≤ βT12x02 ≤ · · · ≤ βT12x0N . (21)
Then, the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the desired path reduces to a
simple inequality as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 5: For l = 2, the following statements hold:
1) xˆ is a fixed point of G if and only if there exists a seperating α in {0, ..., N} such that:
For α different from 0 and N ,
βT12x
0
α − δ12 − θ12x¯0 − ξ12p2 ≤
α
N
ξ12(p1 − p2) < βT12x0α+1 − δ12 − θ12x¯0 − ξ12p2, (22)
For α = 0, 0 < (β12)Tx01 − δ12 − θ12x¯0 − ξ12p2, (23)
For α = N , (β12)Tx0N − δ12 − θ12x¯0 − ξ12p2 ≤ 0. (24)
In this case, α is the number of agents that go towards p1.
2) For ξ12(p1 − p2) ≥ 0, there exists α in {0, ..., N} satisfying (22), (23) or (24).
3) For ξ12(p1 − p2) < 0, there exists at most one α in {0, ..., N} satisfying (22), (23) or (24).
Moreover, there exist some initial distributions for which no such α exists.
Proof: See Appendix A.
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Remark 1: For the scalar case (n = 1), ξ12(p1 − p2) is always non-negative. In fact, in this
case, Φ and ΦP are real exponential functions. This implies that ξ12(p1 − p2) ≥ 0.
Theorem 4 shows that computing the anticipated macroscopic behaviors (fixed points of G)
is equivalent to computing all the fixed points λ’s of F for which it is necessary to assume that
each agent knows the exact initial states of all the other agents. Thus, for each λ ∈ {0, . . . , N}l
such that 1Tλ/N = 1, the agents must count the number of initial positions ηj inside each region
Hλj , j = 1, . . . , l. If ηj = λj , for j = 1, . . . , l, then λ is a fixed point of F . The map F may
have multiple fixed points. Hence, an a priori agreement on how to choose λ should exist. For
example, although non-cooperative, the agents may anticipate that their majority will look for
the most socially favorable Nash equilibrium if many exist and N is large. This λ corresponds
to minimizing the total cost 1
N
∑N
i=1 Ji
(
u∗i (xi, xˆ), xˆ), x
0
i
)
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 min
k=1,...,l
{
1
2
(x0i )
TΓ(0)x0i +
βk(0)
Tx0i + δk(0)
}
, which is also computable by just knowing the exact initial conditions of all
the agents. Once the agents agree on a λ, they start tracking the corresponding fixed point defined
by (15). The fixed point vector λ describes the way the population splits between the destination
points. In fact, λj , j = 1, . . . , l, is the number of agents that go towards pj . When N is large,
this algorithm is costly in terms of number of counting and verification operations. In the next
section, we consider the limiting case of a large population with random initial conditions.
V. FIXED POINT - STOCHASTIC CASE
In this section, we assume that the agents’ initial conditions x0i are random and i.i.d. on some
probability space (Ω,F ,P) with distribution P0 on Rn. In this case, we show that for a large
population, it is enough to know P0 to anticipate the macroscopic behavior. For a continuous
path xˆ and for all ω ∈ Ω, we denote by ΛjN(ω) the number of x0i (ω) in Dj(xˆ), by x¯N(ω) the
mean of the population when tracking xˆ, and by x¯∞ the limit with probability one of x¯N as N
goes to infinity. We deduce from (14) that for all ω in Ω,
x¯N(ω) = Φ(0, t)
T
∑N
i=1 x
0
i (ω)
N
+
l∑
j=1
ΛjN(ω)
N
M
r
∫ t
0
Ψ(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ
− q
r
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψ(σ, t, σ, τ)xˆ(τ) dτdσ,
where Ψ is defined in (10). By the strong Law of large numbers, ΛjN
N
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 1Dj(xˆ)(x
0
i )
and
∑N
i=1 x
0
i
N
converge with probability one respectively to P0(Dj(xˆ)) = P
(
x0i ∈ Dj(xˆ)
)
and
January 26, 2016 DRAFT
14
Ex0i , µ0, as N goes to infinity. Hence,
x¯∞ = Φ(0, t)Tµ0 +
l∑
j=1
P0(Dj(xˆ))
M
r
∫ t
0
Ψ(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ
− q
r
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψ(σ, t, σ, τ)xˆ(τ) dτdσ. (25)
Equation (25) defines an operator Gs that maps the tracked path xˆ to the mean x¯∞. This operator
and its fixed points, if any, depend only on the initial statistical distribution of the agents. The
limiting equation (25) also corresponds to the following stochastic problem. Assume that the
only public information is the initial statistical distribution. As in the deterministic case, we start
our search for a fixed point path by replacing x¯ in (3) by a continuous path xˆ. By Lemma 1,
there exist l regions Dj(xˆ) such that the agents initially in Dj(xˆ) select the control law (8) when
tracking xˆ. By substituting (11) in (8) and the resulting control law in (1), we show that the
mean trajectory E(xi) of a generic agent is equal to Gs(xˆ).
The next theorem establishes the existence of a fixed point of Gs. We define the set ∆l =
{(λ1, . . . , λl) ∈ [0, 1]l|
∑l
j=1 λj = 1} and the map Fs from ∆l into itself such that
Fs(λ1, . . . , λl) =

P
(
βT1jx
0
i ≤ δ1j + θ1jµ0 + ξ1jpλ, ∀j = 1, . . . , l
)
...
P
(
βTljx
0
i ≤ δlj + θljµ0 + ξljpλ, ∀j = 1, . . . , l
)

T
,
where pλ =
∑l
k=1 λkpk. The quantities βkj and δkj are defined in (13), and θkj and ξkj are
defined in (18) and (19).
Assumption 2: We assume that P0 is such that the P0-measure of hyperplanes is zero.
Theorem 6: Under Assumption 2, the following statements hold:
(i) xˆ is a fixed point of Gs if and only if there exists λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) in ∆l such that
Fs(λ) = λ, (26)
for xˆ(t) = R1(t)µ0 +R2(t)pλ.
(ii) Fs has at least one fixed point (equivalently Gs has at least one fixed point).
(iii) For l = 2, if ξ12(p1 − p2) ≤ 0, then Gs has a unique fixed point.
Proof: See Appendix B.
January 26, 2016 DRAFT
15
The finite dimensional operators F and Fs defined respectively in the deterministic and stochastic
cases have similar structures. In fact, in the deterministic case, if the sequence {x0i }Ni=1 of initial
conditions is interpreted as a random variable on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) with distri-
bution P0(A) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 1{x0i∈A}, for all (Borel) measurable sets A, then F (λ) = NFs(λ/N).
In Theorem 6, (i) shows that computing the anticipated macroscopic behaviors is equivalent to
computing all the vectors λ satisfying (26) under the corresponding constraint on xˆ. To compute
a λ satisfying (26), each agent is assumed to know the initial statistical distribution of the agents.
As in the deterministic case, multiple λ’s may exist. Hence, an a priori agreement on how to
choose λ should exist. In that respect, the agents may implicitly assume that collectively they
will opt for the λ (assuming it is unique!) that minimizes the total expected population cost
EJi
(
u∗i (xi, xˆ), xˆ), x
0
i
)
= E min
k=1,...,l
{1
2
(x0i )
TΓ(0)x0i + βk(0)
Tx0i + δk(0)
}
,
which can be evaluated if the agents know the initial statistical distribution of the population.
A. Computation of The Fixed Points
The map Fs is not necessarily a contraction. Hence, it is sometimes impossible to compute
its fixed points by the simple iterative method λk+1 = Fs(λk).
1) Binary Choice Case: We give two simple methods to compute a fixed point of Fs in the
binary choice case. The first method is applicable if ξ12(p1 − p2) > 0. We define in [0, 1] a
sequence αk such that α0 is an arbitrary number in [0, 1] and
λk+1 = (αk+1, 1− αk+1) = Fs(αk, 1− αk) = Fs(λk). (27)
Given that ξ12(p1 − p2) > 0,
[
Fs(t, 1 − t)
]
1
increases with t. We show by induction that αk is
monotone. But αk ∈ [0, 1], therefore, αk converges to some limit α. By the continuity of Fs,
(α, 1−α) satisfies (26). Since in this case Fs may have multiple fixed points, the λ = (α, 1−α)
obtained using this approach depends on the initial value λ0 = (α0, 1− α0). If we define
x¯k = R1(t)µ0 +R2(t)pλk . (28)
This sequence converges to a fixed point of Gs. The second method is applicable if ξ12(p1−p2) ≤
0. In this case
[
Fs(λ, 1− λ)
]
1
− λ decreases with λ. Hence, one can compute the unique zero
of this function by the bisection method.
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2) General Case: In general (l > 2), Fs is a vector of probabilities of some regions delimited
by hyperplanes. Although a fixed point could be computed using Newton’s method, this is
computationally expensive as it requires the values of the inverse of the Jacobian matrix at the
root estimates. Alternatively, one can compute a fixed point of Fs using a quasi Newton method
such as Broyden’s method [37] ( see Section VIII). Using this method, the inverse of the Jacobian
can be estimated recursively provided that Fs is continuously differentiable; this will be the case
if the initial probability distribution has a continuous probability density function.
B. Gaussian Binary Choice Case
We showed in Theorem 6 that for the binary choice case (l = 2), if ξ12(p1 − p2) < 0, then
Gs has a unique fixed point. We now prove that for the binary choice case and Gaussian initial
distribution irrespective of the sign of ξ12(p1 − p2), Gs has a unique fixed point provided that
the initial spread of the agents is “sufficient”. For any n×n matrix Σ0 such that (β12)TΣ0β12 <(
ξ12(p1 − p2)
)2
/2pi, we define
a(Σ0) = δ12 + ξ12p2 −
√
2(β12)TΣ0β12
√
log ξ12(p1 − p2)− 1
2
log 2pi(β12)TΣ0β12
b(Σ0) = δ12 + ξ12p1 +
√
2(β12)TΣ0β12
√
log ξ12(p1 − p2)− 1
2
log 2pi(β12)TΣ0β12
S(Σ0) =
{
µ0 ∈ Rn,
(
βT12 − θ12
)
µ0 ∈ (a(Σ0), b(Σ0))
}
.
Theorem 7: Gs has a unique fixed point if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1) βT12Σ0β12 ≥
(
ξ12(p1−p2)
)2
2pi
.
2) µ0 /∈ S(Σ0).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Theorem 7 states that in the Gaussian binary choice case, if the initial distribution of the
agents has enough spread, then the agents will anticipate the collective behavior in a unique
way. On the other hand, if the uncertainty in their initial positions is low enough and the mean
of population is inside the region S(Σ0) (a region delimited by two parallel hyperplanes), then
the agents can anticipate the collective behavior in multiple ways.
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VI. NONUNIFORM POPULATION WITH INITIAL PREFERENCES
Hitherto, the agents’ initial affinities towards different potential targets are dictated only by
their initial positions in space. In this section, the model is further generalized by considering
that in addition to their initial positions, the agents are affected by their a priori opinion.
When modeling smoking decision in schools for example [38], this could represent a teenager’s
tendency towards “Smoking” or “Not Smoking”, which is the result of some endogenous factors
such as parental pressure, financial condition, health, etc. When modeling elections, this would
reflect personal preferences that transcend party lines. Moreover, we assume in this section that
the agents have nonuniform dynamics.
We consider N agents with nonuniform dynamics
x˙i = Aixi +Biui i = 1, . . . , N, (29)
with random initial states as in Section V. Player i, i = 1, . . . , N , is associated with the following
individual cost:
Ji(ui, x¯, x
0
i ) = E
(∫ T
0
{q
2
‖xi − x¯‖2 + r
2
‖ui‖2
}
dt+ min
j=1,...,l
(Mij
2
‖xi(T )− pj‖2
)∣∣∣x0i). (30)
As N tends to infinity, it is convenient to represent the limiting sequence of (θi)i=1,...,N =
((Ai, Bi,Mi1, . . . ,Mil))i=1,...,N by a random vector θ. We assume that θ is in a compact set Θ.
Let us denote the empirical measure of the sequence θi as PNθ (A) = 1/N
∑N
i=1 1{θi∈A} for all
(Borel) measurable sets A. We assume that PNθ has a weak limit Pθ, that is for all φ continuous,
limN→∞
∫
Θ
φ(x)dPNθ (x) =
∫
Θ
φ(x)dPθ(x). For further discussions about this assumption, one
can refer to [39]. We assume that the initial states x0i and θ are independent.
In the costs (30), a small Mij relative to Mik, k 6= j, reflects an a priori affinity of agent i
towards the destination pj . We assume that an agent i knows its initial position x0i , its parameters
θi, as well as the distributions P0 and Pθ. We develop the following analysis for a generic agent
with an initial position x0 and parameters θ. Assuming an infinite size population, we start by
tracking xˆ(t), a posited deterministic although initially unknown continuous path. We can then
show that, under the convention in Assumption 1, this tracking problem is associated with a
unique optimal control law
u∗(t) = −1
r
(Bθ)T
(
Γθj(t)x+ β
θ
j (t)
)
if x0 ∈ Dθj (xˆ), (31)
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where Γθj , β
θ
j , δ
θ
j are the unique solutions of
Γ˙θj −
1
r
ΓθjB
θ(Bθ)TΓθj + Γ
θ
jA
θ + (Aθ)TΓθj + qIn = 0 (32a)
β˙θj =
(
1
r
ΓθjB
θ(Bθ)T − (Aθ)T
)
βθj + qxˆ (32b)
δ˙θj =
1
2r
(βθj )
TBθ(Bθ)Tβθj −
1
2
qxˆT xˆ, (32c)
with the final conditions Γθj(T ) = M
θ
j In, β
θ
j (T ) = −M θj pj, δθj (T ) = 12M θj pTj pj . The definition
of the basins of attraction becomes
Dθj (xˆ) =
{
x ∈ Rn such that xTΓθjkx+ xTβθjk(xˆ) + δθjk(xˆ) ≤ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , l
}
, (33)
where
Γθjk = Γ
θ
j(0)− Γθk(0)
βθjk(xˆ) = β
θ
j (0)− βθk(0)
δθjk(xˆ) = δ
θ
j (0)− δθk(0).
(34)
In this case, the solutions of the Riccati equations (32a) depend on both the initial preference
vector M θ and the destination points. Hence, the basins of attraction are now regions delimited
by quadric surfaces in Rn instead of hyperplanes. This fact complicates the structure of the
operator that maps the tracked path to the mean. The existence proof for a fixed point relies
now on an abstract Banach space version of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, namely Schauder’s
fixed point theorem [34]. We define
Ψθj(η1, η2, η3, η4) = Φ
θ
j(η1, η2)
TBθ(Bθ)TΦθj(η3, η4),
where Πθj(t) =
1
r
Γθj(t)B
θ(Bθ)T − (Aθ)T , and Φθj is defined as in (9), where Π is replaced by
Πθj . The state trajectory of the generic agent is then
x0θ(t) =
l∑
j=1
1Dθj (xˆ)(x
0)
{
Φθj(0, t)
Tx0 +
M θj
r
∫ t
0
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ
− q
r
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, τ)xˆ(τ) dτdσ
}
.
Assumption 3: We assume that E‖x0‖2 <∞.
The functions defined by (32a), (32b) and (32c) are continuous with respect to θ which belongs
to a compact set. Moreover, θ and x0 are assumed to be independent. Thus, under Assumption
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3, the mean of the infinite size population can be computed using Fubini-Tonelli’s theorem [40]
as follows:
x¯(t) = E(x0θ(t)) = E
(
E
(
x0θ(t)|θ)) = Ex¯θ(t) = l∑
j=1
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
1DMθj (xˆ)(x
0)
{
Φθj(0, t)
Tx0
+
M θj
r
∫ t
0
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ −
q
r
∫ t
0
∫ σ
T
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, τ)xˆ(τ) dτdσ
}
dP0dPθ, (35)
where x¯θ(t) = E
(
x0θ(t)|θ). Equation (35) defines an operator Gp from the Banach space
(C([0, T ],Rn), ‖.‖∞) into itself which maps the infinite population tracked path xˆ to the corre-
sponding mean x¯, itself considered as another potential tracked path.
In the next theorem, we show that Gp has a fixed point. We define
k1 = E‖x0‖ ×
(
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]
‖Φθj(0, t)‖
)
k2 =
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]
∥∥∥∥M θjr
∫ t
0
Ψθj(σ, t, σ, T )pj dσ
∥∥∥∥
k3 =
q
r
l∑
j=1
max
(θ,t,σ,τ)∈Θ×[0,T ]3
‖Ψθj(σ, t, σ, τ)‖.
(36)
Since Θ and [0, T ] are compact and Φθj is continuous with respect to time and parameter θ,
then k1, k2 and k3 are well defined.
Assumption 4: We assume that
√
max(k1 + k2, k3)T < pi/2.
Noting that the left hand side of the inequality tends to zero as T goes to zero, Assumption
4 can be satisfied for short time horizon T for example.
Assumption 5: We assume that P0 is such that the P0-measure of quadric surfaces is zero.
Theorem 8: Under Assumptions 3, 4 and 5, Gp has a fixed point.
Proof: See Appendix B.
VII. NASH EQUILIBRIUM
In the three cases above, deterministic, stochastic and stochastic with initial preferences, we
defined three maps G, Gs and Gp respectively. Depending on the structure of the game, each
player can anticipate the macroscopic behavior of the limiting population by computing a fixed
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point xˆ of G, Gs or Gp, and compute its best response u∗i (xi, xˆ) to xˆ as defined in (8), (31).
When considering the finite population, the next theorem establishes the importance of such
decentralized strategies in that they lead to an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs (2),
(3) and (30). This equilibrium makes the group’s behavior robust in the face of potential selfish
behaviors as unilateral deviations from the associated control policies are guaranteed to yield
negligible cost reductions as N increases sufficiently.
Theorem 9: Under Assumption 3, the decentralized strategies u∗i , i = 1, . . . , N , defined in (8)
and (31) for a fixed point path xˆ, constitute an N -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
Ji(ui, u−i), where N goes to zero as N increases to infinity.
Proof: See Appendix C.
VIII. SIMULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the collective decision-making mechanism, we consider a group of agents moving
in R2 according to the dynamics
A =
 0 1
0.02 −0.3
 B =
 0
0.3

towards the potential destination points p1 = (−39.3,−10), p2 = (−27, 9.5) or p3 = (0, 40). We
draw N = 600 initial conditions from the Gaussian distribution P0 := N
([
−10 0
]T
, 5 I2
)
. We
simulate two cases. In the first one, each agent knows the exact initial states of the other agents
and anticipates the mean of the population accordingly. Following the counting and verification
operations described at the end of Section IV, we find that F has multiple fixed points, for
example, λ = (564, 11, 25). By implementing the control laws corresponding to this particular
λ, 564 agents go towards p1, 11 towards p2 and the rest towards p3 (see Fig.1). Moreover, the
actual average replicates the anticipated mean as shown in this figure. In the second case, the
agents know only the initial distribution P0 of the agents. Then, Broyden’s method converges to
λ = (0.9162, 0.0258, 0.058) satisfying (26). Accordingly, 91.62% of the agents go towards p1,
2.58% towards p2 and the rest towards p3 (see Fig.2). The actual average and the anticipated
mean are approximately the same.
To illustrate the social effect on the individual choices (see Fig. 3), we consider the same
initial conditions. Without social effect (q = 0), (0, 0.25, 0.75) satisfies (26). In this case, the
majority goes towards p3. As the social effect increases to q = 4, some of the agents that went
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towards p1 or p2 in the absence of a social effect change their decisions and follow the majority
towards p3 (see blue balls in Fig. 3). In this case, (0, 0.16, 0.84) satisfies (26). If the social impact
increases more to q = 6, then a consensus to follow the majority occurs.
To illustrate the impact of the individual efforts on the behavior of the population (see Fig.
4), we start with the case where control effort is inexpensive (r = 3) relative to the social effect
(q = 14). In this case, each agent prefers following the majority. A consensus to go towards
p3 occurs. As the effort coefficient increases (r = 30), some of the agents prefer going to a
less expensive destination (p1) than following the majority. By increasing more the penalty on
the effort (r = 60), a third party appears. This subgroup goes towards p2. Moreover, when r
decreases, the agents reach smaller neighborhoods of the destination points.
To illustrate the Gaussian Binary Choice Case, we consider a population of N = 500 agents
initially drawn from the normal distribution N (µ0, 15I2) and moving in R2 according to the
dynamics A = B = I2 towards the destination points p1 = (−20, 0) or p2 = (20, 0). For this
covariance matrix Σ0 = 15I2, S(Σ0) is the region delimited by the vertical lines x = −15
and x = 15. If µ0 = (18 5), i.e. outside S(Σ0), only one −Nash equilibrium corresponding
to λ = (0, 1) exists. If µ0 = (0.5 5), i.e. inside S(Σ0), three -Nash equilibria exist. The first
corresponds to λ1 = (0.89, 0.11) (Fig. 5), the second to λ2 = (0.4, 0.6) (Fig. 6), and the third
to λ3 = (0, 1) (Fig. 7).
IX. CONCLUSION
We consider in this paper a dynamic collective choice model where a large number of agents
are choosing between multiple destination points while taking into account the social effect as
represented by the mean of the population. The analysis is carried using the MFG methodology.
We show that under this social effect, the population may split between the destination points in
different ways. For a uniform population, we show that there exists a one to one map between the
fixed point behaviors (anticipated behaviors) and the fixed points of an operator defined on Rl.
The latter describe the way the agents split between the l destination points. Finally, we prove that
the decentralized strategies developed while tracking the anticipated behaviors are approximate
Nash equilibria. For future work, it is of interest to analyze a model where stochasticity is
extended to the players’ dynamics as well. In that case, the optimal choices (feedback strategies)
are adapted to the underlying filtration and change along the path. This is in contrast to the
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Fig. 1. Collective choice - deterministic initial conditions - λ = (564, 11, 25)
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Fig. 3. Influence of the social effect q
current formulation where the agents can choose without loss of optimality their destination
before they start moving. Moreover, we would like to extend the current formulation to certain
nonlinear models, where the basins of attraction are delimited by more complex manifolds, and
the fixed-point computations would require numerical methods for backward-forward systems
of partial differential equations [41].
APPENDIX A
A. Proof of Lemma 2
In this proof, the subscript M indicates the dependence on the final cost’s coefficient M . For
any M > 0, the agents are optimally tracking a path xˆM . The agent’s i optimal state is denoted
by x∗iM(t). We have
M
2
min
j=1,...,l
(
‖x∗iM(T )− pj‖2
)
≤ JiM(u∗iM , xˆM , x0i ),
where JiM(u∗iM , xˆM , x
0
i ) is the cost define by (2) with the final cost’s coefficient equal M . It
suffices to find an upper bound for JiM(u∗iM , xˆM , x
0
i ) which is uniformly bounded with M . Since
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Fig. 4. Influence of r
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Fig. 5. Gaussian binary choice case - Multiple equilibria - λ = (0.89, 0.11)
(A,B) is controllable, then there exists for each agent i a continuous control law ux0i ,p1(t) on
[0, T ] which transfers this agent from the state x0i to p1 in a finite time T . By optimality, we
have
JiM(u
∗
iM , xˆM , x
0
i ) ≤ JiM
(
ux0i ,p1 , xˆM , x
0
i
)
.
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Fig. 6. Gaussian binary choice case - Multiple equilibria - λ = (0.4, 0.6)
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Fig. 7. Gaussian binary choice case - Multiple equilibria - λ = (0, 1)
But,
JiM
(
ux0i ,p1 , xˆM , x
0
i
)
=
∫ T
0
{q
2
‖xi(ux0i ,p1)− xˆM‖2 +
r
2
‖ux0i ,p1‖2
}
dt,
which is uniformly bounded with M , since xˆM is uniformly bounded with M . Thus, for all
 > 0, there exists an M0 > 0 such that for all M > M0,
min
j=1,...,l
(
‖x∗iM(T )− pj‖2
)
< .
B. Proof of Lemma 3
Lets consider y a fixed point of Tλ. We define
n(t) = Γ(t)y(t) + q
∫ t
T
Φ(t, σ)y(σ)−MΦ(t, T )pλ.
One can easily check that (y, n) satisfies
y˙ = Ay − 1
r
BBTn y(0) = x¯0 (37)
n˙ = −ATn n(T ) = M(y(T )− pλ).
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y and n are respectively the optimal state and co-state of the following LQR problem:
min
u
∫ T
0
r
2
‖u‖2dt + M
2
‖x(T )− pλ‖2 (38)
Subject to x˙ = Ax+Bu x(0) = x¯0.
Therefore, n has the representation n(t) = P (t)y(t) + g(t), where P is the unique solution of
the Riccati equation (17) and g satisfies
g˙ = −(A− 1
r
BBTP (t))Tg g(T ) = −Mpλ.
By solving g and implementing its expression in n = Py + g, and by implementing the new
expression of n in the dynamics of y, one can show that y(t) = R1(t)x¯0+R2(t)pλ. Conversely, let
(n, y) the unique solution of (37). We define m(t) = Γ(t)y(t)+q
∫ t
T
Φ(t, σ)y(σ)dσ−MΦ(t, T )pλ.
One can easily check that ˙(m− n) = (1
r
ΓBBT − AT )(m− n), with m(T ) = n(T ). Therefore,
m = n. Hence, y is a fixed point of (14). We now prove the uniform boundedness of the fixed
point paths yλ with respect to M . The paths yλ are the optimal states of the control problem
(38). Since (A,B) is controllable, one can show that the corresponding optimal control law uλ
satisfies ∫ T
0
r
2
‖uλ‖2dt ≤
∫ T
0
r
2
‖u0‖2dt,
where u0 is a continuous control law that transfers the state y from y(0) to pλ. u0 is independent
of M . We have
yλ(t) = exp(At)x¯0 +
∫ t
0
exp(A(t− σ))Buλ(σ)dσ.
Therefore, ∫ T
0
‖yλ‖2dt ≤ K1 +K2
∫ T
0
‖uλ‖2dt +K3
(∫ T
0
‖uλ‖2dt
) 1
2
,
for some positive constants K1, K2, K3 which are independent of M . Hence, yλ is uniformly
bounded with M .
C. Proof of Theorem 5
The first point follows from Theorem 4 and (21). For 2) and 3), we define
aN(α) =
N
ξ12(p1 − p2)
(
βT12x
0
α − δ12 − θ12x¯0 − ξ12p2
)
.
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We start by proving 2). Suppose that there does not exist any α in {0, ..., N} satisfying (22),
(23) or (24). Zero does not satisfy (23), hence aN(1) ≤ 0 < 1. One does not satisfy (22) and
aN(1) < 1, hence aN(2) ≤ 1. By induction, we have aN(N) ≤ N − 1. Therefore, N satisfies
(24). Thus, by contradiction, there exists α in {0, ..., N} satisfying (22), (23) or (24). We now
prove the third point. Suppose that there exist multiple α’s satisfying (22), (23) or (24). Let α0 be
the least of these α’s. If α0 < N , then in view of ξ12(p1− p2) < 0, aN(α0 + 1) < α0 ≤ aN(α0).
aN(j) is decreasing. Hence, for all α > α0, aN(α) ≤ aN(α0 +1) < α0 < α. Therefore, α0 is the
unique α satisfying (22), (23) or (24). If ξ12(p1− p2) < 0, then the initial distribution for which
aN(α) is in (0, 1) for all α in {0, ..., N} does not have any α in {0, ..., N} satisfying (22), (23)
or (24).
APPENDIX B
A. Proof of Theorem 6
We start by proving (i). Let xˆ be a fixed point of Gs and λj = P0(Dj(xˆ)). By replacing
the probabilities in the expression of Gs by λj , j = 1, . . . , l, we get xˆ = Gs(xˆ) = Tλ(xˆ),
where λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) and Tλ are as defined in (14). Hence, xˆ is a fixed point of Tλ. By
Lemma 3, xˆ(t) = R1(t)µ0 + R2(t)pλ. By replacing this expression of xˆ in Dj(xˆ), we get
λ = Fs(λ). Conversely, consider λ = (λ1, . . . , λl) in ∆l such that λ = Fs(λ) and let xˆ(t) =
R1(t)µ0 +R2(t)pλ. The path xˆ is the unique fixed point of Tλ and(
P0(D1(xˆ)), . . . , P0(Dl(xˆ))
)
= Fs(λ) = λ.
Hence, xˆ = Tλ(xˆ) = Gs(xˆ). We now prove the second point. Noting that the set ∆l is convex
and compact in Rl, we just need to show that Fs is continuous. Then, Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem [34] ensures the existence of a fixed point. Let λr be a sequence in ∆l converging to
λ. Let
Dkr =
{
x ∈ Rn such that (βkj)Tx ≤ δkj + θkjµ0 + ξkjpλr , ∀j = 1, . . . , l
}
Dk =
{
x ∈ Rn such that (βkj)Tx ≤ δkj + θkjµ0 + ξkjpλ, ∀j = 1, . . . , l
}
.
We have∣∣∣[Fs(λr)]k−[Fs(λ)]k∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ ∫
Rn
(
1Dkr(x)−1Dk(x)
)
dP0(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫
Rn
∣∣∣1Dkr(x)−1Dk(x)∣∣∣ dP0(x).
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But, Dkr and Dk are regions delimited by hyperplanes. Hence, under Assumption 2,∫
Rn
∣∣∣1Dkr(x)− 1Dk(x)∣∣∣ dP0(x) = ∫
Rn
∣∣∣1 ◦
Dkr
(x)− 1 ◦
Dk
(x)
∣∣∣ dP0(x).
But,
∣∣∣1 ◦
Dkr
(x)−1 ◦
Dk
(x)
∣∣∣ ≤ 2 and converges to zero for all x in Rn. Thus, by Lebesgue dominated
convergence theorem [40], the integral of this function converges to zero. This proves that Fs is
continuous. Finally, we prove (iii). For l = 2, the fixed points of Fs are of the form (α, 1− α).
The set of the fixed points of Fs is compact. Thus, the set of the first components of these fixed
points is compact. Let α0 be the minimum of those first components. Consider α > α0. Hence,{
(β12)
Tx0i − δ12 − θ12µ0 − ξ12p2 ≤ αξ12(p1 − p2)
}
⊂ {(β12)Tx0i − δ12 − θ12µ0 − ξ12p2 ≤ α0ξ12(p1 − p2)
}
,
which implies [
Fs(α, 1− α)
]
1
≤
[
Fs(α0, 1− α0)
]
1
= α0 < α.
Thus, (α0, 1− α0) is the unique fixed point of Fs, and xˆ(t) = R1(t)µ0 + R2(t)p(α0,1−α0) is the
unique fixed point of Gs.
B. Proof of Theorem 7
We show in Theorem 6 that the fixed points of Gs can be one to one mapped to the fixed
points of Fs. The initial states x0i are distributed according to a Gaussian distribution N (µ0,Σ0).
Therefore, βT12x
0
i are distributed according to the normal distribution N
(
βT12µ0, β
T
12Σ0β12
)
. Thus,
one can analyze the dependence of
[
Fs(α, 1 − α)
]
1
− α on α to show that this function has a
unique zero in [0, 1] in case 1) or 2) holds. Indeed, if 1) or 2) holds, the sign of the derivative
with respect to α of
[
Fs(α, 1−α)
]
1
−α does not change. Thus, this function is monotonic. This
implies that Fs and Gs have unique fixed points.
C. Proof of Theorem 8
We use Schauder’s fixed point theorem [34] to prove the existence of a fixed point. We
start by showing that Gp is a compact operator, that is continuous and maps bounded sets to
relatively compact sets. Let xˆ be in C([0, T ],Rn) and {xˆk}k∈N be a sequence converging to xˆ
in
(
C([0, T ],Rn), ‖.‖∞
)
. Let
Qj > max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]2
‖Φθj(t)‖+ max
(θ,t)∈Θ×[0,T ]4
‖Ψθj(t)‖+ max
θ∈Θ
‖M θ‖.
January 26, 2016 DRAFT
29
We have
‖Gp(xˆk)−Gp(xˆ)‖∞ ≤
l∑
j=1
Qj
{
qT 2
r
‖xˆk − xˆ‖∞ + V1j + Qj‖pj‖T + q‖xˆ‖∞T
2
r
V2j
}
,
where
V1j =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
∣∣∣1Dθj (xˆk)(x0)− 1Dθj (xˆ)(x0)∣∣∣‖x0‖ dP0dPθ
V2j =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
∣∣∣1Dθj (xˆk)(x0)− 1Dθj (xˆ)(x0)∣∣∣ dP0dPθ.
Under Assumption 5,
V1j =
∫
Θ
∫
Rn
∣∣∣1 ◦
D
θ
j (xˆk)
(x0)− 1 ◦
D
θ
j (xˆ)
(x0)
∣∣∣‖x0‖ dP0dPθ.
But, ∣∣∣1 ◦
D
θ
j (xˆk)
(x0)− 1 ◦
D
θ
j (xˆ)
(x0)
∣∣∣‖x0‖ ≤ 2‖x0‖
and converges to zero for all (x0, θ) in Rn×Θ. We have E‖x0‖ <∞. Therefore, by Lebesgue’s
dominated convergence theorem [40], V1j converges to zero. By the same technique, we prove
that V2j converges to zero. Hence, Gp is continuous. Let V be a bounded subset of C([0, T ],Rn).
Let {Gp(xˆk)}k∈N ∈ Gp(V ). By the continuity of Φθj(σ, t) with respect to (σ, t, θ), of its derivative
with respect to t and σ, and by the boundedness of xˆk, one can prove that for all (t, s) in [0, T ]2,
‖Gp(xˆk)(t)−Gp(xˆk)(s)‖ ≤
(
K1E‖x0‖+K2
)
|t− s|,
where K1 and K2 are positive constants. This inequality implies the uniform boundedness and
equicontinuity of {Gp(xˆk)}k∈N. By Arzela-Ascoli Theorem [34], there exists a convergent sub-
sequence of {Gp(xˆk)}k∈N. Hence, Gp(V ) and its closure are compact sets, and Gp is a compact
operator. Now, we construct a nonempty, bounded, closed, convex subset U ⊂ C([0, T ],Rn)
such that Gp(U) ⊂ U . Let Q = max(k1 + k2, k3), where k1, k2 and k3 are defined in (36). We
start by defining on [0, T ] the function R(t) = Q cos(
√
Qt) + Q tan(
√
QT ) sin(
√
Qt). Under
Assumption 4, R(t) is positive. Moreover, R satisfies R(t) = Q+Q
∫ t
0
∫ T
σ
R(τ) dτdσ. Let
U =
{
x ∈ C([0, T ],Rn)| ‖x(t)‖ ≤ R(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
}
.
The set U is an nonempty, bounded, closed and convex subset of C([0, T ],Rn). For all x ∈ U ,
∀t ∈ [0, T ],
‖Gp(x)(t)‖ ≤ Q+Q
∫ t
0
∫ T
σ
R(τ) dτdσ = R(t).
Hence, Gp(U) ⊂ U . By Schauder’s Theorem, Gp has a fixed point in U .
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 9
We consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ {1, ..., N} applying an arbitrary full state feedback control
law ui. Suppose that this agent i can profit by a unilateral deviation from the decentralized
strategies. This means that
Ji(ui, u
∗
−i) ≤ Ji(u∗i , u∗−i). (39)
In the following, we prove that this profit is bounded by . We denote respectively by xi and x∗j
the states corresponding to ui and u∗j . In view of (30), the compactness of Θ, the continuity of x
∗
j
with respect to θ and E‖x0i ‖2 <∞, the right hand side of (39) is bounded by Q1 independently
of N . For any X and Y in C([0, T ],Rn), we define
< X|Y >= E
(∫ T
0
XT (t)Y (t) dt
∣∣∣x0i)
and ‖X‖2 =
√
< X|X >. We have
Ji(ui, u
∗
−i) = Ji
(
xi(ui), xˆ, x
0
i
)
+
q
2
∥∥∥xˆ − 1
N
N∑
j=1
x∗j
∥∥∥2
2
+
q
2N2
‖x∗i − xi‖22 + S1 + S2 + S3,
where
S1 =
q
N
〈
x∗i − xi
∣∣∣xi − xˆ〉
S2 =
q
N
〈
x∗i − xi
∣∣∣xˆ− 1
N
N∑
j=1
x∗j
〉
S3 = q
〈
xˆ− 1
N
N∑
j=1
x∗j
∣∣∣xi − xˆ〉,
with xˆ is a fixed point of Gp. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
|S1| ≤ q
N
∥∥∥x∗i − xi∥∥∥
2
∥∥∥xi − xˆ∥∥∥
2
.
In view of (39) and the bound Q1,
∥∥∥x∗i − xi∥∥∥
2
and
∥∥∥xi − xˆ∥∥∥
2
are bounded. Thus, |S1| ≤ η1/N ,
where η1 > 0. Similarly, |S2| ≤ η2/N , where η2 > 0. We define
αN =
∥∥∥xˆ− 1
N
N∑
j=1
Ex∗j
∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥∫
Θ
x¯θ dPθ −
∫
Θ
x¯θ dPNθ
∥∥∥
2
,
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where x¯θ is defined in (35). We have∥∥∥xˆ− 1
N
N∑
j=1
x∗j
∥∥∥2
2
≤ 2α2N + 2
∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ex∗j − x∗j
)∥∥∥2
2
.
By the compactness of [0, T ]×Θ, the family of functions x¯θ(t) defined on Θ and indexed by t
is uniformly bounded and equicontinuous. By Corollary 1.1.5 of [42], we deduce
lim
N→+∞
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∥∥∥xˆ(t)− 1
N
N∑
j=1
Ex∗j(t)
∥∥∥ = 0.
Thus, αN converges to 0 as N increases to infinity. By the independence of the initial conditions
(and thus the independence of x∗j , j = 1, . . . , N ) and the assumption E‖x0i ‖2 < ∞, we deduce
that ∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
Ex∗j − x∗j
)∥∥∥2
2
= O(1/N).
Thus, S3 and
∣∣∣Ji(x∗i , xˆ, x0i)−Ji(u∗i , u∗−i)∣∣∣ converge to 0 as N increases to infinity. By optimality,
we have Ji
(
x∗i , xˆ, x
0
i
)
≤ Ji
(
xi, xˆ, x
0
i
)
. Therefore, Ji(ui, u∗−i) ≥ Ji(u∗i , u∗−i) + N , where N =
Ji
(
x∗i , xˆ, x
0
i
)
− Ji
(
u∗i , u
∗
−i
)
+ S1 + S2 + S3 converges to 0 as N increases to infinity.
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